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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates a recent trend in EU legislative politics: the de facto shift of decision-
making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas, and the subsequent adoption of 
legislation at first reading. Previous research has explained why fast-track legislation occurs and 
evaluated its democratic consequences. This study focuses on how the EP has responded to the 
steep increase in informal and fast-tracked legislation. First, we show how fast-track legislation 
has informalised legislative decision-making, transformed inter-organisational relations, and 
created new asymmetrical opportunities and constraints. Second, we theorise the political 
discontents in response to this transformation. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism and 
bargaining theory, we argue, first, that actors will seek to redress asymmetrical opportunities 
through institutional reform; that attempts of redress will centre on the control of negotiation 
authority and information flows; and that institutional reform will be highly contested. Second, 
we suggest that the chances of successful redress will be low in the EP as a decentralised 
organisation unless two conditions are met: 1) the extent of fast-track legislation reaches a 
critical level, and 2) the organisation goes through a period of wider reform; the former will 
facilitate reform through the increased visibility of disempowerment and reputational costs; the 
latter through package deals in a multi-issue negotiation space, and/or the strategic evocation of 
collective parliamentary norms. Third, we probe our argument by analysing how the EP’s rules 
pertaining to codecision have been contested, negotiated and reformed from the introduction of 
fast-track legislation in 1999 to the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision 
Files in 2009. Based on qualitative document analysis and semi-structured elite interviews, our 
paper offers a first systematic analysis of how fast-track legislation has impacted on intra-
organisational politics and reform in the EP.  
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Introduction1 
 
This paper investigates how the European Parliament (EP) has responded to a recent 
transformation of legislative politics in the European Union (EU): the trend to “fast-
track” legislation under the codecision procedure, and the resulting informalisation and 
seclusion of the political process. The possibility of fast-track legislation was introduced 
with the Amsterdam Treaty, and since 1999 an ever increasing percentage of acts has 
been adopted at first reading by the EP and the Council of the European Union: between 
1999 and 2004, 28% of codecision dossiers were adopted “early”; between 2004 and 
2006, the number went up to 63%; and the overall percentage of “early agreements” in 
the last parliamentary term was 72% (European Parliament 2004a; 2009a).  
 
This increase in early conclusion has had three repercussions on the conduct of 
codecision. First, to agree a file early, a legislative compromise must be reached 
informally prior to the EP’s first reading. This compromise is negotiated in restricted 
and secluded “trilogues”, bringing together representatives from EP, Council and 
European Commission. Second, the procedure is abridged, as legislation is adopted after 
only one rather than three possible readings. Third, the interdependence between inter- 
and intra-organisational negotiations has increased, and the new rules and arenas of 
interaction have created novel opportunities for some actors and novel constraints for 
others. Our paper explores the EP’s reaction to the increase in fast-track legislation, and 
asks: Has the changing practice of codecision since 1999 led to intra-organisational 
contestation and reform in the EP?2 Have newly constrained actors responded, and 
which procedural rules have they contested? Why have contestation and redress (not) 
translated into reform of the EP’s rules of co-legislation?  
 
Our interest is warranted for three reasons. First, the sheer volume of fast-track 
legislation begs for empirical investigation, theoretical explanation and normative 
evaluation. At the same time, we know little about how fast-tracked legislation is 
agreed, under which conditions it occurs, and what its consequences are. In spite of an 
extensive debate about inter-organisational relations under codecision, only one 
contribution has looked at legislative influence in the informal arena (Häge/Kaeding 
                                                
1  Research for this paper has been supported by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council 
(Grant RES-000-22-3661) and by the European University Institute.  
2  In this paper, we distinguish between organisations, i.e. the collective actors involved in the 
legislative process, and institutions, i.e. the man-made rules of behaviour that facilitate and restrict 
interaction between individual and collective actors (North 1990).  
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2007). Similarly, although practitioners have commented for more than a decade on the 
transformation of codecision, only three academic studies have offered systematic 
analysis: one pilot study on intra-organisational relations in the Council and Parliament 
(Farrell/Héritier 2004), as well as two quantitative studies of early conclusion, one of 
the Fifth European Parliament (Rasmussen 2011), and one of the more extensive 1999 
to 2009 period (Reh et al. 2010). Second, practitioners and scholars alike have praised 
fast-track legislation for its efficiency (Héritier 2007) and criticised informalisation on 
democratic grounds (Imbeni et al. 2001; Raunio/Shackleton 2003; Reh 2008). Since EP 
President Jerzy Buzek, shortly after his election in 2009, publicly dismissed first 
reading agreements, the debate about the benefits and costs of fast-track legislation has 
intensified in the EP. Our paper systematically tracks this debate since its origins, with a 
focus on the reasons for contestation, and the success or failure of reform. Third, 
although our case study is of EU legislative politics only, our theoretical framework and 
empirical findings will be of wider interest to scholars of shared decision-making and 
organisational reform.  
 
Our paper proceeds in four steps. Section 1 demonstrates how fast-track legislation has 
informalised legislative decision-making, transformed relations between co-legislators, 
and created new asymmetrical opportunities and constraints. Section 2 theorises and 
exemplifies the political conflict in response to this transformation. Drawing on rational 
choice institutionalism and bargaining theory, we argue that actors will seek to redress 
asymmetrical opportunity structures through institutional reform; that reform attempts 
will centre on the stringency of rules, on the control of negotiation authority and on 
information flows; and that institutional reform will be highly contested. Section 3 
focuses on the likelihood of successful redress through institutional reform. Earlier 
research has shown that the chances of successful redress will be low where 
opportunities are asymmetrical and the organisation is decentralised (Farrell/Héritier 
2004). Yet, we argue that even under such conditions successful institutional reform is 
likely where 1) the increase in fast-track legislation reaches a critical level; and 2) the 
organisation goes through a period of wider reform. The former condition facilitates 
reform through an increased visibility of actors’ lost influence and of the EP’s 
reputational costs; the latter allows “reformers” to use the momentum of wider reform 
by striking package deals in a multi-issue negotiation agenda, and/or by evoking 
collective organisational norms. Section 4 assesses our argument empirically by 
showing how the EP’s rules pertaining to codecision have been contested, negotiated 
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and reformed over three time periods since 1999: first, the early years of fast-track 
legislation (1999-2004), during which we see first political contestation, culminating in 
the non-binding 2004 Guidelines for First and Second Reading Agreements under the 
Codecision Procedure; second, the first half of the Sixth EP (2004-2006), during which 
we witness a surge in both early agreements and political contestation, but no attempt at 
further reform; third, the second half of the Sixth EP (2007-2009), featuring a steep 
increase in fast-track legislation and political contestation, coinciding with the 
“Working Party for Parliamentary Reform”, and ending with agreement on the binding 
Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files in the EP’s May 2009 plenary. Based 
on qualitative document analysis and a series of semi-structured interviews with EP and 
Commission officials as well as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) between 
May 2008 and June 2010, we trace the factors that have translated political contestation 
into institutional reform, and offer a first systematic analysis of how the EP has 
responded to fast-track legislation. The paper concludes by outlining the wider 
implications for the study of shared decision-making and organisational reform.   
 
1. Codecision Transformed: Formal Reform and Legislative Practice 
 
The introduction of codecision in 1993 was accompanied by diverse expectations and 
concerns. On the one hand, codecision was seen as a means to bolster procedural 
democracy; empowering the EP promised to make EU legislation more accountable, 
inclusive and transparent, and to challenge—or complement—the “cartel of elites” that 
had hitherto dominated negotiation between Council and Commission (Wallace 1996, 
33). On the other hand, practitioners and scholars feared that the complex new 
procedure would render EU decision-making more cumbersome and inefficient 
(Scharpf 1994). The routine use of fast-track legislation has refuted both expectations: 
on the one hand, the recourse to informal and secluded negotiations has disappointed 
hopes for greater accountability, inclusiveness and transparency; on the other hand, the 
new procedure has proved to be highly efficient: the Fifth and Sixth EP passed a total of 
797 legislative acts under codecision; on average, it took 20.7 months to adopt a piece 
of legislation, and 15.4 months to pass a first reading deal (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Codecision—Average Duration (1999-2009) 
 Average duration (months) Total number 
Procedure concluded at 1st reading 15.4 458 
Procedure concluded at 2nd reading 25.7 262 
Procedure concluded at 3rd reading 35.2 77 
All procedures 20.7 797 
Source: Authors’ Own Database 
The possibility of fast-track legislation was formally introduced with the Amsterdam 
Treaty; it allows Parliament and Council to adopt a legislative dossier at first reading, 
with the procedure closed accordingly. Since their formal introduction, first reading 
deals have surged from 17% in 1999/2000 to 80% in 2008/2009 (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Codecision—Stage of Conclusion (1999-2009) 
Year Number of 
concluded files  
Percentage of 
files concluded 
at 1st reading 
Percentage of 
files concluded 
at 2nd reading 
Percentage of 
files concluded 
at 3rd reading 
1999-2000 48 17 62 21 
2000-2001 67 25 42 33 
2001-2002 70 30 46 24 
2002-2003 74 20 51 29 
2003-2004 144 36 51 13 
2004-2005 26 69 31 0 
2005-2006 69 65 25 10 
2006-2007 82 58 37 5 
2007-2008 100 74 20 6 
2008-2009 177 80 16 1 
Source: European Parliament 2009a 
 
This trend is unlikely to be reversed in the near future—on the contrary, Parliament, 
Council and Commission seem to agree on its desirability. In the 2007 Joint 
Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure they commit 
themselves to “cooperate in good faith with a view to reconciling their positions as far 
as possible and thereby clearing the way, where appropriate, for the adoption of the act 
concerned at an early stage” (European Parliament et al. 2007). Furthermore, while 
early agreements were initially foreseen for “technical” and “certain politically urgent” 
dossiers (European Commission 2007), a recent quantitative analysis of all codecision 
files in the Fifth and Sixth EP has demonstrated that even salient and redistributive 
dossiers are routinely adopted at first reading (Reh et al. 2010).  
 
This observation has as much impact on the study of codecision as it has on the 
legislative practice. Most importantly, it calls for re-directing academic attention from 
the decision-rules in the final bargaining stage to the institutions governing informal 
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decision-making prior to first reading; from actors’ opportunities and constraints in the 
formal process to differential empowerment in the informal arena; and from inter-
organisational relations to intra-organisational bargaining. Indeed, fast-track legislation 
has increased the procedure’s overall efficiency; yet, it has also shifted decision-making 
power between and within each of the co-legislators. It is the shift of decision-power 
within the EP as well as the attempt to redress this shift that is at the heart of our paper.3  
 
The following gives a more detailed account of how codecision has been transformed 
since 1999. We show that routine fast-track legislation has 1) increased the recourse to 
informal politics; 2) brought about more cooperative EP-Council relations; and 3) 
created new opportunities as well as constraints for parliamentary actors in particular.  
 
When the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of fast-track legislation, Art. 
251 TEC merely stipulated that the Council, in its first reading, could adopt a proposed 
legislative act as amended by the EP “if it approve[d] all the amendments contained in 
the European Parliament’s opinion”. Yet, as the Treaty gave no indication as to how 
such agreement was to be reached, the co-legislators had to flesh out the formal rules of 
codecision on a day-to-day basis. The possibility of early conclusion therefore opened 
the door widely to interpretation; most importantly, however, it led to “a shift from 
formal, sequential bargaining between Council and Parliament to a more informal, 
simultaneous, and diffuse set of relations” (Farrell/Héritier 2004, 1199). The 
mechanism behind a first reading agreement is the following: after the Commission has 
tabled its legislative proposal, representatives of the three institutions enter into 
informal negotiations. These negotiations take place before the EP has issued its formal 
opinion and before the Council has adopted its common position. If an informal 
compromise is reached, the EP includes the Council’s propositions in its first reading 
amendments; it requires simple majority to adopt these amendments. Subsequently, the 
Council, acting by qualified majority, accepts the Commission proposal as amended by 
Parliament, with the procedure closed and the act adopted accordingly. Informalisation 
is, therefore, a necessary condition for early conclusion—because a fast-tracked act 
must be rubberstamped (otherwise the procedure cannot be concluded early), and 
because the legislative compromise must be pre-agreed prior to the first formal steps. 
 
                                                
3  Fast-track legislation also has significant implications for the distribution of power within the 
Council, but given the scope of this paper these developments cannot be included here.  
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The informal negotiations take place in so-called “trilogues”—“private meetings 
between representatives of the European Parliament, Council and Commission which 
take place at each stage of the codecision procedure” (House of Lords 2009, 13). 
Trilogues were first used in the wake of Maastricht to facilitate the work of the 
conciliation committee prior to third reading (Rasmussen/Shackleton 2005). When 
Parliament and Council began to make use of the possibility to agree early, trilogues 
quickly became the accepted negotiation format, and they are now at the heart of fast-
track legislation (European Parliament et al. 2007; Shackleton 2000). In most first 
reading trilogues, the EP is represented by the rapporteur for the dossier, the Council by 
the President of a working group or COREPER, and the Commission by the Director or 
Director General responsible for the legislative initiative; most trilogues are also 
attended by support staff from all three institutions. Yet, the composition of trilogues 
varies: the EP’s rapporteur may be accompanied by “shadow rapporteurs” from other 
political groups and/ or the chair of the responsible committee; the Council can second a 
representative of the next Presidency; and in “political trilogues” the Commissioner him 
or herself can negotiate on behalf of the Commission (Interv. Com1 2008).  
 
All first reading trilogues are, however, characterised by five features. First, they bring 
together a variable and restricted set of decision-makers rather than the full set (as does 
the EP’s plenary or a Council meeting), or a formally restricted sub-set (as does a 
parliamentary committee or the conciliation delegation). Second, trilogues are secluded: 
documentation is not available, and meetings are closed to non-members and the public. 
Third, trilogues begin before EP and Council have adopted a public stance on the file. 
Fourth, trilogues aim to facilitate compromise and to coordinate positions so as to close 
the procedure at first reading; trilogues therefore provide a forum for inter-
organisational negotiation rather than parliamentary debate  (Jacqué 2007). Fifth, while 
representatives can pre-agree a legislative compromise in trilogue, any such agreement 
must be formally endorsed by the EP’s plenary and the Council of Ministers.  
 
In sum, informal decision-making in trilogues is at the heart of fast-track legislation, 
and the allocation of roles in trilogues, as well as information about and control of this 
arena, become as crucial to assess legislative influence—inter- and intra-
organisational—as the distribution of power in the formal legislative process.  
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The study of inter-organisational relations in EU legislative politics has hitherto focused 
on two aspects: first, legislative influence under the formal rules of codecision (see a.o. 
Kreppel 1999; Tsebelis/Garrett 2000; Thomson/Hosli 2006); second, the strategic use of 
institutional politics by Parliament to bring about a change of the formal rules 
(Farrell/Héritier 2003; Hix 2002). Yet, both legislative output and legislative practice 
since 1999 suggest that EP and Council have begun to cooperate closely and 
constructively, with a focus on resolving policy-disagreement on EU legislation.  
Indeed, in order to fast-track a dossier, representatives from Commission, Council and 
Parliament need to work together closely, regularly and informally. Such cooperation 
has not been free of conflict. When the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, the co-
legislators disagreed about the adequate mix of formal and informal politics. While the 
Council actively pushed for fast-track legislation, the EP was “eager to retain the 
distinct nature of the first and second readings, insisting on the importance of the formal 
organs, committee and plenary, as the normal forums for contact and debate between 
the two institutions” (Raunio/Shackleton 2003, 177).  
 
To allow the use of early agreements, cooperation between and within the co-legislators 
has since become structured by informal and semi-formal institutions, the most 
important of which is the Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the (New) 
Codecision Procedure, an agreement concluded in 1999 and amended in 2007. 
Codecision practitioners therefore talk about “rules of engagement” (Shackleton 2000) 
and «pratiques dégagées au fil du temps» (Jacqué 2007, 2), which are designed to oil 
shared decision-making. Dramatically reinforcing interaction between EP and Council 
(Shackleton 2004, 3I), successful fast-track legislation post-Amsterdam has thus been 
seen as starting a new era of EP-Council relations—characterised by cooperative 
interaction rather than confrontational institutional politics (Jacqué 2007, 12; Intervs. 
Com2 2008; EP1 2008). A successful strategy to cope with the complexity of 
codecision, informalisation seems to have transformed inter-organisational relations too.  
 
In sum, in order to fully use the formal provisions of Art. 251 TEC, the co-legislators 
must a) pre-agree a compromise in secluded and restricted trilogues; b) endorse this 
compromise in the formal arena; and c) cooperate closely and constructively.  
 
These three features of fast-track legislation have raised our curiosity about the EP’s 
response—given that informalisation runs counter to the expectations raised when 
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Parliament was empowered; and given that the informalisation of shared decision-
making will re-calibrate the opportunities and constraints created by the formal rules of 
codecision. Indeed, if actors’ influence over policy-outcomes is defined by formal and 
informal rules of procedure, then increased interdependence between co-legislators, as 
well as new rules and arenas of interaction will create novel opportunities and 
constraints for selected actors (Farrell/Héritier 2004). This holds true for politics within 
and between organisations; we are interested in the former. For parliamentary actors, 
the re-calibration of opportunities and constraints under fast-track legislation has three 
sources: 1) the restriction of decision-making; 2) the seclusion of negotiation; 3) the 
requirement to endorse compromise at first reading and the majority needed to do so.   
 
First, the restriction of trilogues implies differentiated access to and control over de 
facto decision-making. New institutional opportunities are created for negotiators who 
represent the EP in the informal arena, while new constraints are generated for those 
actors who are consistently absent from trilogues (Farrell/Héritier 2004, 1200ff.). 
Negotiators in restricted settings will be particularly empowered where a) intra-
parliamentary control is limited and weakly institutionalised; b) key decisions about 
parliamentary and Council amendments are agreed—rather than merely discussed—in 
trilogue; and c) pre-decisions are formalised—rather than re-opened—in committee and 
plenary. The reverse is true for actors who are absent from trilogues, and who benefit 
from strong institutionalised intra-organisational control; from preparation rather than 
decision-making in the informal arena; and from the possibility to discuss and amend 
rather than rubberstamp pre-agreed decisions.  
 
Second, the seclusion of trilogues implies differentiated access to information flows 
between co-legislators. Negotiators—and rapporteurs in particular—will be particularly 
empowered where it is not only impossible to attend trilogues, but where it is a) difficult 
to follow the decision-process ex post through official documentation, and where b) pre-
agreement reached in trilogue is not subject to extensive public contestation, debate and 
amendment in committee and plenary. In turn, the recourse to secluded negotiations will 
constrain those actors that are not involved in trilogues, first and foremost, by denying 
them access to information. Such constraints will be minimised where trilogues are 
tightly controlled, and where pre-agreed amendments are publicly contested and 
debated in committee and plenary. 
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Third, an early agreement hinges upon the endorsement by the EP’s plenary of the 
agreement reached with Council in trilogue; at first reading, Parliament requires a 
simple majority of votes to do so. Scholars and practitioners have therefore pointed to 
the differential empowerment of actors through early agreements, because legislative 
influence varies between the first and subsequent readings  (Rasmussen 2011, 2; Imbeni 
et al. 2001). Rapporteurs are empowered in two ways: first and politically, because the 
inter-organisational compromise can be presented as a “fait accomplit”; second and 
institutionally, because formalisation of this compromise only requires a simple 
majority of votes cast (Rasmussen/Shackleton 2005). In turn, actors who are not 
involved in trilogues will be less constrained where public contestation and debate is 
pronounced, and where the threshold for formalising a pre-agreement is high.  
 
The next two sections will follow up on this general discussion of the institutional 
opportunities and constraints under fast-track legislation. Section 2 explores the “bones 
of contention”; it theorises and explores how different parliamentary constituencies 
have responded, and which procedural features have been subject to redress. Sections 3 
and 4 then turn to the chances of successful redress; they theorise and investigate 
whether and why contestation over the institutional rules of fast-track legislation has (or 
has not) translated into reformed internal parliamentary rules of co-legislation. One 
preliminary caveat is, however, in order: this paper neither theorises nor analyses 
whether new institutional opportunities and constraints have actually shifted power and 
influence in the EP; such a study would require analytical tools and primary documents 
that would allow to trace whether and how rapporteurs have been more successful in 
realising their policy-preferences than other individual or group actors (Rasmussen 
2011). This paper, instead, identifies novel opportunities and constraints, and traces the 
conflict over how the new political space of codecision was institutionalised.  
 
2. Actors’ Preferences: Differential Empowerment and Reputational Costs 
 
So far, we have shown that the formal rule-change of codecision has informalised 
legislative decision-making and increased inter-organisational cooperation between EP 
and Council. Following up on Farrell and Héritier (2004, 1188), we have also argued 
that the transformation of codecision has created new and asymmetrical opportunities 
and constraints. We now turn to the question of whether and how newly constrained 
actors in Parliament, who suffered a relative loss in decision-making power, have tried 
 11 
to redress this transformation by reforming the rules of co-legislation, and whether and 
why they have been successful in doing so. 
 
Our discussion of actors’ preferences in this section, and of institutional reform in 
section 3, is prefaced by the following argument about the context of shared decision-
making that is co-decision: we assume that inter-organisational interaction will impact 
on intra-organisational politics; more specifically, we assume that the changing rules of 
bargaining between EP and Council will trigger intra-organisational contestation at the 
individual and collective level in Parliament, and that this contestation will, under 
certain conditions, lead to intra-organisational reform.  
 
First, we draw on Knight’s rational choice institutionalism (1992). More specifically, 
we build on the assumption that actors seek to maximise their influence over policy-
outcomes by seeking to increase their institutional power. Whether they succeed in 
doing so will largely depend on their power position in the bargaining over new 
institutional rules governing fast-track legislation, as well as specific environmental 
conditions, such as pre-existing institutional rules or changes in the environment. More 
specifically, we expect that those actors who see their influence over legislative 
outcomes constrained because they are excluded from the inter-organisational arena will 
seek remedies by promoting institutional reform which may lead to institutional change.  
Second, we argue that fast-track legislation not only creates asymmetrical opportunities 
for individual actors; increasing interdependence between Parliament and Council will 
also affect the EP as a collective actor—its strategic position, legislative influence and 
public reputation. Therefore, fast-track legislation will not only trigger a response by 
actors who seek to claw back their institutional power; it will also be redressed by those 
actors who retain an important role in intra-organisational decision-making.  
 
In sum, actors’ preferences over the rules of co-legislation will be driven by two 
instrumental motivations: asymmetrical legislative influence and constraints for 
individual actors; strategic and reputational benefits and costs for the organisation as a 
collective actor. In response, both individual “losers” and organisational “leaders” will 
seek remedies by promoting institutional reform which may lead to institutional change. 
In particular, actors will seek to redefine internal procedures within their own arena so 
as to limit the application of fast-track legislation tout court and—if fast-track 
legislation is chosen—to limit the power of rapporteurs.  
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In the following, we will look at key parliamentary actors and their preferences over 
institutional reform (the dependent variable of our study); in sections 3 and 4, we will 
look at the process of strategic bargaining over such reform. Hence, we engage in a 
conceptual experiment and distinguish between the involved actors and their 
preferences on the one hand, and environmental conditions on the other hand. By 
assuming specific actors’ preferences, and varying two key environmental conditions—
the frequency of fast-track legislation, and the presence of wider organisational 
reform—we derive hypotheses as to the expected outcome of the strategic interaction.  
 
On the basis of our theoretical arguments, we expect that two types of parliamentary 
actors will attempt to redress the rules of fast-track legislation: a) actors who are faced 
with increased institutional constraints and a potential loss of legislative influence, and 
b) actors who are in horizontal leadership positions within Parliament. We identify 
small political groups and rank-and-file MEPs as representatives of the former, and the 
EP’s Vice-Presidents as representatives of the latter. These actors will seek redress, by 
demanding more stringent rules of fast-track legislation; yet, this demand will meet with 
the resistance of those actors who are empowered by fast-track legislation. We identify 
large political groups, committee chairs and rapporteurs as empowered actors. 
 
The rules of fast-track legislation and their reform will, therefore, be subject to conflict 
in the EP; in the ensuing bargaining process we expect that reform attempts are targeted 
at creating stringent rules on (i) the scope of fast-track legislation; (ii) control over 
delegated negotiators; and (iii) access to information flows between EP and Council. 
More specifically, the following issues will be at the centre of bargaining:  
• Shall early agreements be used exceptionally or routinely? 
• Shall the rules of fast-track legislation be binding or voluntary?  
• Shall behavioural prescriptions be precise or vague? 
• Shall the rapporteur represent the EP in trilogue, or shall access be broadened? 
• Shall the rapporteur be mandated by committee?  
• If so, shall the committee vote or decide by consensus?  
• Shall the mandate equal a procedural permission to negotiate? 
• Or shall the mandate be a (vague or detailed) substantive policy brief?  
• Will the mandate be global or shall it be adjusted during negotiations? 
• Is the rapporteur obliged to report back to the responsible committee?  
• How shall the compromise between EP and Council be treated in committee? 
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Below we explain our expectations of actors’ preferences over institutional reform in 
more detail, and draw on our interview material to illustrate the arguments. 
 
Based on our theoretical line of argumentation, we expect that actors in horizontal 
leadership positions—first and foremost, the EP’s President and Vice-Presidents—will 
advocate more stringent rules governing fast-track legislation. These actors will, in 
particular, push for the transparency and public visibility of legislative decision-making, 
in order to minimise the reputational costs for Parliament. Indeed, it is plausible to 
assume that the EP’s leadership is much concerned with the coherence of Parliament, 
and with the image that their organisation offers to the outside world. The “leaders” 
wish Parliament to be perceived as a prime locus of democratic debate and of 
transparent decision-making. They are therefore particularly receptive to the growing 
public criticism of inter-organisational collusion between EP and Council, of lacking 
transparency in fast-track legislation, and of deals that are pre-cooked by a small group 
of actors. In short, faced with growing public criticism, the EP’s leadership will attempt 
to a) bring down the number of early agreements by introducing stringent rules, or b) 
regulate co-legislation in a way that maximises the transparency of the political process. 
Our interviewees in the EP largely confirmed this assumption. They state that criticism 
of fast-track legislation has been expressed by both national parliaments and Brussels-
based lobby groups (Interv. EP3 2009; Bunyan 2007; House of Lords 2009), and that 
the EP’s leadership is vulnerable where the scope and style of fast-track legislation are 
under attack (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP2 2010). It is also suggested repeatedly that the EP’s 
leadership is particularly concerned about the lack of visibility, publicity and open party 
political conflict—given the history of the EP’s institutional battles and empowerment, 
as well as notoriously low voter turnout in EP elections (Intervs. EP3 2009; EP4 2009; 
EP1 2010; EP2 2010; EP3 2010; EP4 2010).  
 
Second, we also expect that small political groups and rank-and-file parliamentarians 
will push to contain and institutionalise fast-track legislation. Our reasoning is, 
however, different and based on asymmetrical empowerment rather than the visibility of 
reputational costs. We argue that small groups and rank-and-file MEPs lose institutional 
opportunities for two reasons. First, fewer rapporteurs come from small political groups 
than from large parties. This means, in turn, that MEPs from small groups are less likely 
to be involved in trilogues and more likely to lose influence over shaping policies. 
Second, given the endorsement of the legislative compromise by simple majority in 
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plenary, small groups and rank-and-file MEPs de facto—if not de jure—lose the 
opportunity to make amendments and to initiate political debate (Rasmussen/Shackleton 
2005). Both constraints also amount to a loss of publicity. In short, faced with 
increasing institutional constraints on their influence, small political parties and rank-
and-file MEPs will push to a) make early agreements the exception rather than the rule, 
or b) regulate co-legislation in a way that maximises the control of the rapporteur by 
the committee. Our interviewees backed this assumption. It was mentioned repeatedly 
that small political groups are critical of early agreements, and advocate more 
constrained rapporteurs and broader access to information about the negotiation process 
(Intervs. EP4 2009; EP1 2010; EP2 2010; EP4 2010). The Greens in particular are said 
to have advocated the containment of early agreements and more transparent fast-track 
legislation—through strict requirements of mandating, feedback and ex ante and ex post 
votes in committee (Intervs. EP3 2009; EP2 2010). One interviewee also mentioned a 
practical reason for the small political groups’ preference: covering all dossiers in a 
committee by a few group members is challenging, and a clear mandate as well as 
accessible information would facilitate this task (Interv. EP2 2010).  
 
Third, we expect committee chairs to prefer more flexible rules governing early 
agreements. Our reasoning is as follows. Where legislation is fast-tracked, the 
committee gains further relevance as a decision-arena: it is in committee that the 
decision to attempt an early agreement is taken, the rapporteur is mandated, decisions 
about representation in trilogues are taken, and negotiation strategies with the Council 
are developed. Committees have also been shown to differ significantly in their 
propensity to fast-track legislation—with LIBE and ECON passing the most, and ITRE 
and TRAN passing the fewest early agreements (Reh et al. 2010). We therefore assume 
that committee chairs, a) try to resist the attempt at standardising the practice of fast-
track legislation, or b) where institutionalisation is attempted, they will try to keep the 
rules flexible, and maintain the privileged position of committees. This argument is 
supported by our interviewees, who stress the strategic importance of committees vis-à-
vis Council in fast-track legislation (Intervs. EP3 2009; EP3 2010); underline how 
strongly practices vary across committees (Interv. EP1 2010); and indicate committees’ 
opposition to more centralised rules (Intervs. EP1 2009; EP2 2009; EP2 2010).  
 
Finally, we expect large political groups and rapporteurs to advocate fast-track 
legislation and to prefer more flexible rules governing early agreements. This 
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expectation is based on the inverse argument to our assumption on small political 
parties and rank-and-file parliamentarians. We argue that large political groups and 
rapporteurs gain institutional opportunities for two reasons. First, more rapporteurs 
come from large political groups, which are therefore at the centre of fast-track 
legislation. This implies that MEPs from large groups are more likely to be involved in 
trilogues, and more likely to gain policy-influence over shaping policies. Second, the 
rapporteur is particularly empowered where his or her deal with the Council is easy to 
adopt, which is the case at first reading where only a simple majority is required to 
adopt amendments. In short, rapporteurs from large political parties are particularly 
empowered, politically and institutionally (Farrell/Héritier 2003; 2004), and will 
therefore push for a) an extensive use of fast-track legislation, or b) flexible rules where 
co-legislation is institutionalised. Our interviewees consistently back this assumption, 
by describing the conflict over fast-track legislation as a divide between small and large, 
rather than left and right, groups (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP1 2010; EP2 2010; EP3 2010). 
However, interviewees also stress that large political groups, too, face a trade-off 
between policy-influence in the informal arena, and public visibility in the legislative 
process (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP2 2010). Recent research has also shown that the 
likelihood of early agreement decreases where the rapporteur’s policy-preference 
deviates from the EP median (Rasmussen 2011); a finding which casts doubt over the 
rapporteur’s unconstrained power in the informal arena.  
 
3. Theorising the Likelihood and Choice of Institutional Reform 
 
So far, we have made three arguments: first, fast-track legislation creates new 
institutional opportunities and constraints with a concomitant shift of power through 
restricted, secluded bargaining in trilogues; second, newly constrained actors who 
suffered a relative loss of power, and actors in horizontal leadership positions contest 
fast-track legislation; third, contestation focuses on whether fast-track legislation should 
be governed by more stringent institutional rules, to reduce the likelihood of early 
agreement and to impose controls on inter-organisational bargaining in trilogue.  
 
Assuming actors’ preferences over outcomes as described in section 2, we will now turn 
to the environmental conditions under which the EP’s “losers” and “leaders” will 
successfully redress fast-track legislation by reforming the rules governing early 
agreements. A pilot study of the first years of codecision post-Amsterdam has argued 
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convincingly that the EP is, per se, unlikely to adopt such rules: it is a decentralised 
organisation where the benefits and costs of early agreements are distributed 
asymmetrically. “In these organizations, individual actors [...] will seek to maximize 
their individual control of legislative outcomes regardless of the consequences for their 
organization as a whole” (Farrell/Héritier 2004, 1190). Yet, in May 2009, the EP 
adopted a Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files as part of its revised Rules 
of Procedure. In the following, we address this puzzle theoretically, by developing 
explanations for why Parliament reformed, and for why it chose a particular set of rules. 
 
In a nutshell, we argue that even in the EP as a decentralised organisation, successful 
redress is likely where two conditions are met. Given the actors’ preferences specified 
above, we vary two environmental conditions that facilitate institutional change, leading 
to more stringent rules and tighter controls on inter-organisational bargaining: 1) the 
extent of early agreements; and 2) the presence or absence of overall parliamentary 
reform. The two complementary hypotheses developed below are derived from rational 
choice institutionalism and bargaining theory; they assume that both “losers” and 
“leaders” are motivated by a respective gain or loss in power.  
 
First, we argue that the drastic increase in the number of early agreements adopted per 
year can explain a) why calls for adopting internal procedural rules of fast-track 
legislation become louder, and b) why these calls translate into a change of rules. We 
argue that the increase of early agreements—slow in the first years post-Amsterdam; 
dramatic in the Sixth EP—made fast-track legislation more visible, both internal and 
external to Parliament, and that greater visibility had two effects. First, at the level of 
the individual parliamentary actor, greater visibility made the loss of institutional power 
more obvious and reform more pressing. “Losers” may accept fast-track legislation 
where 17% of files are de facto decided in trilogue and rubberstamped, but they will be 
much less willing to do so where the number is above 50%. Similarly, “leaders” will 
find it harder to rebut criticism of fast-track legislation from the “outside world”—be 
this lobbyists, national parliaments or the media—where early agreements account for 
more than half of the concluded files. Second, increasing inter-organisational collusion 
in the informal arena will raise questions about the EP’s strategic and reputational 
position, vis-à-vis Council and the wider public. Once a high number of early 
agreements is reached, it will therefore be more difficult to see the pressure for 
institutional reform as a purely individual—rather than collective—concerns. Given 
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actors’ divergent preferences about the desirability of more stringent rules governing 
early agreements, we therefore submit  
 
H1  A steep increase in the number of early agreements will lead to an institutional 
reform providing for some more stringent rules of fast-track legislation. 
 
Second, we argue that the presence or absence of an overall reform agenda matters for 
obtaining objectives of institutional change. This argument is based on two equifinal 
causal mechanisms.  
 
First, under the roof of the overall reform, individual institutional reform measures are 
given impetus and political momentum. Overall reform creates wider political attention 
extending also to individual reform measures. From a strategic bargaining perspective, 
an entire reform programme covering multiple institutional reform issues, moreover, 
allows for issue linkages between individual reform items and the conclusion of a 
package deal across a variety of reform measures. In other words, the institutional 
attributes of a decision-making agenda matter. Assuming actors with divergent 
preferences and a decision-making rule which is unanimity or at least consensus, a 
multiple-issue agenda as opposed to a single-issue agenda holds more promising 
prospects for reform. It offers the possibility that the winners of a reform measure in 
one area compensate the losers in another issue area, a possibility which does not exist 
in the case of a single issue agenda (Davis 2004; Héritier 2007).  
 
Second, the presence of an overall reform agenda also equips the EP’s leadership with a 
strategic advantage. We argue that the “strategic use of norm-based arguments” 
(Schimmelfennig 2001, 48) is the “leaders’” main bargaining tool, and that an overall 
reform context makes it easier to frame the institutional reform of fast-track legislation 
as a response to challenged parliamentary norms. The routine recourse to informal 
secluded negotiation, and the unconstrained empowerment of selected negotiators under 
fast-track legislation can, indeed, be framed as challenging such norms, namely the 
EP’s role as either a debating chamber (by constraining or even replacing public 
contestation), or as a working parliament (by curtailing the role of committees) (Steffani 
1979). We argue that advocating such a “collective frame” is facilitated by wider 
negotiations about an organisation’s role and functioning; such wider negotiations offer 
a “discursive hook” to advocate the reform of fast-track legislation as benefiting the EP 
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as a collective actor, rather than redressing individual loss of power. A “collective 
frame” will facilitate reform for two reasons: first, because it can cluster wider 
parliamentary support around the suggested change; second, because the evocation of 
consensual collective norms can “shame” the “winners” of unconstrained fast-track 
legislation into accepting reform (for similar arguments see Checkel 2005, 808ff.; 
Schimmelfennig 2001, 62ff.; Rittberger/Schimmelfennig 2006, 1157ff.). In short, in a 
context of overall reform, the evocation of core parliamentary norms—the “leaders’” 
main bargaining strategy—will be both more credible and more effective.  
 
Given actors’ divergent preferences about the desirability of more stringent rules 
governing early agreements, we therefore submit   
 
H2 The existence of an overall parliamentary reform agenda will lead to an 
institutional reform including elements of a stricter regulation of fast-track 
legislation. 
 
Table 3: Hypotheses, Operationalisation of Variables, Empirical Indicators 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Indicators: IV 
 
 
Indicators: DV 
 
Disconfirmation 
H1 
 
 
 
High percentage of EA Introduction and reform 
of institutional rules: 
- Status: stringent, 
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
restricted  
- Control: strict 
checks on trilogues 
- Language: precise 
 
No introduction of 
institutional rules OR 
 
Introduction of weak 
institutional rules:  
- Status: flexible, non 
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
unlimited  
- Control: limited 
checks on trilogues 
- Language:  general 
 
HII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low percentage of EA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No introduction of 
institutional rules OR 
 
Introduction of weak 
institutional rules:   
- Status: flexible, non 
binding 
-  Scope of EA: 
unlimited  
- Control: limited 
checks on trilogues 
- Language:  general 
 
Introduction and reform of 
institutional rules: 
- Status: stringent, 
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
restricted  
- Control: strict checks 
on trilogues 
- Language: precise 
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H2 
 
 
Overall reform  
 
Introduction and reform 
of institutional rules: 
- Status: stringent, 
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
restricted  
- Control: strict 
checks on trilogues 
- Language: precise 
 
No introduction of 
institutional rules OR: 
 
Introduction of weak 
institutional rules:  
- Status: flexible, non-
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
unlimited 
- Control: limited 
checks on trilogues 
- Language: general 
 
HII 
 
 
No overall reform 
 
No introduction of 
institutional rules OR: 
 
Introduction of weak 
institutional rules:  
- Status: flexible, non-
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
unlimited 
- Control: limited 
checks on trilogues 
- Language: general 
 
Introduction and reform of 
institutional rules: 
 
- Status: stringent, 
binding 
- Scope of EA: 
restricted 
- Control: strict checks 
on trilogues 
- Language: precise 
 
In the following, we will empirically assess how the EP’s rules pertaining to conclusion 
at first reading have been contested, negotiated and reformed from the introduction of 
fast-track legislation in 1999 to the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating 
Codecision Files as part of the revised Rules of Procedure in 2009. In order to assess 
our hypotheses, we further sub-divide this period into the following phases: 
 
1) In order to isolate the role played by the number of early agreements, we 
compare two phases: first, 1999-2004, during which early agreements rise 
moderately from 17% in 1999/2000 to 36% in 2003/2004; second, 2004-2006, 
during which early agreements increase dramatically beyond 50%. Based on H1, 
and assuming actors divergent preferences, we expect no or weak 
institutionalisation in phase 1, and institutional reform providing for more 
stringent rules of fast-track legislation in phase 2. 
 
2) In order to assess the role played by the presence or absence of overall 
parliamentary reform, we further sub-divide the 2004-2009 period as a period 
during which the number of early agreements is high: first, 2004-2006, during 
which the number of early agreements has reached a high level, but there is no 
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overall parliamentary reform agenda; second, 2007-2009, during which the 
number of early agreements has reached a critical level, and the EP’s “Working 
Party on Parliamentary Reform” is set up. Based on H2 and in view of the 
diverging preferences of actors, we therefore expect institutional reform 
measures of some stringency in the second half of the Sixth EP only.   
 
Our empirical analysis draws on three data sources. First, we conducted semi-structured 
elite interviews with EP and Commission officials as well as MEPs between May 2008 
and June 2010. Second, we use publicly accessible documents, including the EP’s 
Activity Reports (1999-2004; 2004-2006; 2004-2009); the Parliament’s 1999 opinion on 
the Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements of the New Codecision Procedure; the 
2004 Guidelines for First and Second Reading Agreements under the Codecision 
Procedure; the Interim Report on Legislative Activities and Interinstitutional Relations 
by the Working Party on Parliamentary Reform; and the Code of Conduct for 
Negotiating Codecision Files. Third, based on the EP’s Legislative Observatory we 
created a dataset of all 797 codecision procedures concluded in the Fifth and Sixth EP 
between July 20, 1999 and July 17, 2009 (Reh et al. 2010). 
 
4. Successful Redress? Parliamentary Conflict over Institutional Reform 
 
How does H1—A steep increase in the number of early agreements will lead to an 
institutional reform providing for more stringent rules of fast-track legislation—hold up 
to empirical scrutiny? We looked at the number of early agreements between 1999 and 
2006, and their impact on contestation and institutional reform. In order to isolate the 
impact of an increase in numbers from our explanatory factor “overall reform 
programme”, we compared two time periods: 1999-2004, when early agreements rose 
consistently and moderately from 17% in 1999/2000 to 36% in 2003/2004; and 2004-
2006, when early agreements rose dramatically to 69% by 2005. Based on our 
theoretical line of argumentation, we expect the EP’s “losers” and “leaders” to contest 
the practice of fast-track legislation from the outset, and to be opposed by the 
“winners”; however, only in the 2004-2006 period—when a high level of early 
agreements (of at least 50%) was reached—do we expect successful redress through 
some stringent institutional reform measures. To summarize our findings, the empirical 
data does not support this expectation: the reform measures adopted in a period of low 
increase of early agreements were non-binding and even encouraged early agreement; 
yet, a high frequency of early agreements did not by itself induce stringent reforms.  
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More specifically, our empirical data shows that a small group of actors in the EP began 
to contest the rules of fast-track legislation as early as 2001; yet, concerns only became 
widespread in the Sixth EP. In 2001—when the percentage of early agreements had 
reached 25%—the three Vice-Presidents responsible for conciliation began to discuss 
whether early agreements were at all desirable, and how, if at all, fast-track legislation 
should be institutionalised. Two years into the new procedure, the Vice-Presidents 
praised the “flexibility” of early agreements and the “greater degree of trust and 
willingness to cooperate on the part of the institutions”, but also raised concerns: about 
the lack of openness and transparency, about the quality of legislation passed at first 
reading, and about the “balance of power between the two co-legislators” (European 
Parliament 2004a, 26; Imbeni et al. 2001; Intervs. Com2 2008; Com3 2008; EP2 2008).  
 
In spite of such early criticism by actors in horizontal leadership positions, our evidence 
shows that only once the number of early agreements had significantly risen (above 
50%), did this debate spread to a wider circle of actors within the EP, and triggered 
criticism from the “outside world”, to which the EP, in turn, needed to respond. Policy-
makers talk about a shift of “culture” post-2004, when fast-track legislation was still a 
“non-issue”, to a period when MEPs began to speak out against early agreements, both 
privately and publicly (Interv. EP4 2009). All interviewees backed this opinion, and 
ascribed the shift in both level of attention and degree of contestation to the steep 
increase in the number of early agreements. “The main reason is the statistics”, argued 
one interviewee, as well as the fact that fast-track legislation had become “the dominant 
practice” (Interv. EP3 2009). Others observed that in the Sixth EP “everybody had 
noticed something had happened” (Intervs. EP2 2010; EP4 2010), and that the rejection 
of early agreements had become “politically correct” (Interv. EP1 2010). 
 
As expected, such criticism touched upon both, the differential empowerment of 
individual actors, and the wider role of Parliament in inter-organisational negotiations. 
Indeed, MEPs raised concerns about the “extreme liberty” left to the rapporteur in some 
committees, and about the plenary’s role of mere rubberstamping (Interv. EP1 2010). In 
addition, an ever wider circle of actors saw core parliamentary principles at stake; 
interviewees, in particular, commented on the lack of transparency and democracy 
(Intervs. EP4 2009; EP 2 2010; EP4 2010), as well as visibility and publicity in the 
legislative process (Intervs. EP3 2009; EP4 2009). The growing criticism inside the EP 
was, not least, described as responding to pressure from the “outside”: national 
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parliaments, supposed to scrutinise the legislative process, “complained more and more 
that it was too fast for them” (Interv. EP3 2009), while a wider group of “outsiders” 
began to criticise the secrecy of negotiation and the lack of public debate (Interv. EP2 
2010). In short, a variety of actors began to ask what the EP stood to gain from fast-
track legislation (Interv. EP4 2009).  
 
However, in spite of the consistent but moderate increase of early agreements in the 
Fifth EP, contestation did not translate into stringent institutional reform. The 1999 
Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the New Codecision Procedure 
encouraged the Council and Parliament to “cooperate in good faith [...] so that wherever 
possible an act can be adopted at first reading”, and to “establish appropriate contacts” 
to this effect (European Parliament et al. 1999). It was the rapporteur who conducted 
these contacts for the EP, and (s)he faced few substantive or procedural constraints 
(Farrell/Héritier 2004, 1200, 1202; Rasmussen/Shackleton 2005, 12). As stated in the 
EP’s 2004 Activity Report, the Fifth EP “had no uniform policy on defining the nature 
of [...] [informal] contacts, with each parliamentary committee having its own case-by-
case approach to informal meetings and negotiations” (European Parliament 2004a, 26).  
 
The first—unsuccessful—attempt at reform came in 2001, when the EP’s Vice-
Presidents proposed internal guidelines; as expected, these guidelines would have 
addressed both the scope of early agreements, and the control over negotiating 
authority: informal negotiations with the Council were only to start on the basis of a 
substantive policy mandate by the EP committee (Farrell/Héritier 2004, 1204). Yet, this 
proposal met with substantial resistance on the part of the rapporteurs, especially from 
large political groups. In the words of one prominent MEP:  
“They can write down whatever they want. They write a lot of reports. Nobody will 
take notice of that. [...] Those people who are really doing the job, need the contacts and 
they use the contacts. [...]. I am an independent MEP. In am not one that follows the 
order of the Vice President. [...] There are some people who want such rules, but they 
have no chance” (quoted in Farrell and Héritier 2004, 1205).  
 
While rapporteurs did recognise that some change of rules was necessary, they argued 
against an overly formal approach, which, they believed, would make it more difficult 
to reach consensus with the Council (Farrell and Héritier 2004, 1205). The compromise 
between this newly empowered group of actors and the EP’s more critical leadership 
were the Guidelines for First and Second Reading Agreements under the Co-Decision 
 23 
Procedure, adopted by the Conference of the Presidents in 2004 and entering into force 
in the Sixth EP (European Parliament 2004b).  
 
Hence, our first expectation—divergent actors’ preferences, in combination with a   
moderate increase in early agreements will either lead to continued non-regulation, or to 
non-binding, weak and vague institutional rules—is borne out by empirical evidence. 
Adopted at a time when the percentage of early agreements had increased but remained 
below 50%, the 2004 Guidelines are an example of weak institutionalisation.   
 
First, the Guidelines put those actors centre-stage that suffered a relative loss of 
decision-making power under fast-track legislation: the committee, shadow rapporteurs 
and small political parties. Second, the Guidelines attempted to redress differential 
empowerment by giving the parliamentary committee greater control over the 
rapporteur. While encouraging informal contacts at all stages of codecision, concrete 
negotiations should wait “until the committee has adopted its first or second reading 
amendments” which could then “provide the mandate on the basis of which the 
committee’s representatives can negotiate”; any significant change in this position 
“should have broad political support” (European Parliament 2004b). In addition, the 
Guidelines stated that parliamentary representation was to be decided by the 
coordinators, permitting the involvement of all political groups. Third, the Guidelines 
aimed to give the responsible committee more information; the rapporteur was required 
to “report back regularly on the state of negotiations” (European Parliament 2004b). 
Yet, the Guidelines were both vague and non-binding. The document is riddled with 
vague compromise formulations: verbs like “should”, “can” and “be encouraged” pre-
dominate; the Guidelines were also “suggestions for best practice” only, applied very 
differently across committees and with no means of central enforcement (Intervs. EP1 
2008; EP2 2008; Working Party 2007, 4). In short, the consistent but moderate increase 
of early agreements from 1999-2004 was accompanied by a period of non-
institutionalisation and, subsequently, a set of non-binding and flexible rules.  
 
While the 1999-2004 period fully confirms our expectations, this is not the case for the 
2004-2006 period. Indeed, although the percentage of early agreements had reached 
50% (69% in 2004/2005 and 65% in 2005/2006); although criticism had grown inside 
and outside Parliament; and although the “atmosphere was excellent for reforms” 
(Interv. EP4 2010), there was no successful redress. Empowered actors with vested 
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interests in fast-track legislation supported flexible rules (and, in turn, the use of early 
agreements). As one interviewee put it, the Guidelines de facto “promot[ed] [...] early 
conclusions” (Interv. EP4 2009; see also Intervs. EP1 2010; EP2 2010)—with early 
agreements, indeed, continuing to increase. Hence, H1 is disconfirmed.  
 
We next turn to the empirical assessment of H2—The existence of an overall 
parliamentary reform agenda will lead to an institutional reform including elements of 
a stricter regulation of fast-track legislation. In order to assess H2, we analyse the 
second half of the Sixth EP, namely the period of 2007-2009. Doing so, allows us to 
study three years during which the percentage of early agreements continued to be 
significantly above 50%; slightly dropping to 58% by 2007, then rising steeply to 74% 
by 2008 and to 80% by 2009. Holding constant a high level of early agreements, we 
scrutinise the role played by our second explanatory factor, the existence of overall 
parliamentary reform. To put it briefly, our empirical evidence supports this expectation 
to some extent: as expected, the 2007-2009 period ends with a higher level of 
regulation. However, the adopted rules of fast-track legislation are less binding and 
stringent than H2 would have us expect. 
 
In the latter half of the Sixth EP, we can observe a trend towards the regulation of fast-
track legislation, culminating in the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating 
Codecision Files as part of the EP’s Rules of Procedure in May 2009. The adoption of 
the Code—more binding, more stringent and more detailed than the 2004 Guidelines—
is difficult to explain with the arguments used so far: in 2009, the EP is still a 
decentralised organisation; actors have divergent reform preferences since they “win” 
and “lose” through fast-track legislation; and the percentage of early agreements was 
high by 2005 already. What had changed, however, was the institutional context of 
negotiation. In 2007, the Conference of Presidents set up the “Working Party for 
Parliamentary Reform”, and the Sixth EP went through a period of overall reform in the 
second half of its legislative term. In this context the Code of Conduct was adopted.  
 
The Working Party, chaired by the German Socialist MEP Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, was 
a high-level political group, with a broad reform mandate and a good reputation across 
political groups and among MEPs more widely (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP4 2010). As part 
of its mandate to reform the legislative process, the Working Party was explicitly tasked 
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to look at the practice of early agreements. In its 2007 Second Interim Report, the 
Working Party summarised the state of institutionalisation as follows: 
“[c]urrently not all Members and Parliament staff are fully aware of the existence of the 
guidelines, and their status—though approved by the Conference of the Presidents—is 
only that of suggestions for best practice: as a result, recourse to the guidelines is rare 
and if used, their implementation very much depends on the discretion of the Members 
involved and/or the staff of the committee secretariat” (Working Party 2007, 4). 
 
The Code of Conduct was the reaction to this diagnosis. It is a set of more precise rules 
about the conduct of fast-track legislation; and it is the first set of such rules that was 
extensively discussed in various bodies, and that was confirmed—if not debated—in 
plenary (Interv. EP1 2010; EP4 2010). The Code was drafted by the EP’s codecision 
unit upon request by the Working Party; the document was discussed and agreed in the 
Working Party (Intervs. EP3 2009; EP4 2009); subsequently the draft Code was 
submitted to the Conference of the Presidents who endorsed it in September 2008. The 
Code was adopted as part of the “Corbett Report”, revising the EP’s Rules of Procedure, 
first, in the Constitutional Affairs Committee, and subsequently in the 2009 May 
plenary. The Corbett Report was approved by 552 votes in favour, 101 votes against 
and 51 abstentions; the Code became Annex XX of the revised Rules of Procedure, with 
Rule 70 referring explicitly to the Code (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP 3 2010; EP4 2010; 
European Parliament 2009b). 
 
In view of the Guidelines’ inconsistent application, it was the aim of the Code to 
strengthen the content, to enhance the status, and to improve the visibility of the rules 
governing fast-track legislation (Working Party 2007, 3). As one interviewee put it, the 
Code aimed “to limit the number of files concluded at first reading” (Interv. EP4 2009).  
The Code addresses similar issues as the Guidelines, but it does so in more detail.  
 
First, the Code stresses the key role played by the EP committee as “the main 
responsible body during the negotiations”; the committee also decides on a case-by-case 
basis “whether it actually wants to attempt early conclusion” (European Parliament 
2008). Second, the Code broadens access to the informal arena; the committee—no 
longer the coordinators—decide on parliamentary representation in trilogue. This 
decision on “the EP’s negotiating team”— no longer “the rapporteur”—shall respect 
“political balance” (European Parliament 2008). Third, the Code introduces an explicit 
and substantive mandate, namely the committee’s or the plenary’s amendments; where 
negotiations take place before amendments have been agreed, the committee “shall 
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provide guidance”, but such contacts are to be “exceptional” (European Parliament 
2008). The committee shall also “update the mandate of the negotiating team in the case 
that further negotiations are required”; only under exceptional time pressure shall this 
decision fall to “the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs, if necessary together with 
the committee chair and the coordinators” (European Parliament 2008). Fourth, the 
Code of Conduct broadens access to information flows. It specifies the kinds of 
documents to be used in trilogues, which should be made available to the committee 
following negotiations. Also, “[a]fter each trilogue, the negotiating team shall report 
back to the committee on the outcome of the negotiations”; under time constraints the 
team must fully update the shadow rapporteurs and, if necessary, the coordinators 
(European Parliament 2008). Finally, to redress institutional opportunities lost to (small) 
political parties and ordinary MEPs, the Code introduces a “cooling off period” between 
the end of the inter-organisational negotiations and the final vote in the EP’s plenary. 
 
As a part of the EP’s codified and respected Rules of Procedure, the Code of Conduct is 
a more binding, visible and precise set of rules. Yet, the negotiation outcome and 
process suggest the importance of compromise—in all likelihood reached through 
package deals and issue linkage. Given the actors’ conflicting preferences outlined in 
section 2, the Code was contested, in particular with regard to its legal status, the 
stringency of the mandate, and the clarity of provisions.  
 
As Annex XX to the EP’s Rules of Procedure, the Code is linked to Rule 70, and a close 
comparison between the two documents reveals a degree of divergence between the 
Code and the Rule. Rule 70II states that “[b]efore entering into such negotiations [to 
reach early conclusion] the committee responsible should, in principle, take a decision 
by the majority of its members”; the Code, by contrast, talks about “broad consensus” in 
committee. Rule 70 requires the committee to “adopt a mandate, orientation or 
priorities”; the Code, by contrast, requires “amendments adopted in committee or in 
plenary”. The co-existence of those provisions indicates the need for compromise; in 
case of conflict, Rule 70 would prevail (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP2 2010). The two 
contradictions between Rule 70 and the Code concern precisely the two most contested 
issues in the Working Party: first, the Code’s Art. 2—de facto limiting the scope of fast-
track legislation by requiring a “case-by-case decision” that must be “politically 
justified” and taken either by “broad consensus or, if necessary, by a vote” in 
committee; second, the Code’s Art. 4, that makes trilogue negotiations without a 
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mandate by committee an “exceptional case”. Both articles were pushed, in particular, 
by small political groups (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP3 2010; EP4 2010). A further trace of 
conflict can be found in the Code’s language. While opting for more linguistic 
constraints than the Guidelines—consistently replacing “should” by “shall”—the Code 
features formulations that require interpretation and are open to different readings. Such 
formulations—“as a general rule”, “political priorities”, “an urgent situation”, “the 
attitude of a given Presidency”, “as a general principle”, “guidance”, “in the exceptional 
case”, “if necessary” or “sufficient time”—indicate the need for compromise face to 
continuous conflict (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP2 2010; EP4 2010).   
 
In short, the reform of institutional rules met with continued resistance from key actors 
who had benefited from fast-track legislation; in section 2 we identified committee 
chairs, large political groups and rapporteurs as such actors. Our interviews support our 
argument that agreement between the “pro” and “anti” reform groups in Parliament was 
greatly facilitated by the existence of an overall reform agenda with ambitious diverging 
goals that required compromise (Interv. EP1 2010); indeed, when the Corbett Report 
passed through the Constitutional Affairs Committee, the Code itself was not 
considered “a big thing” (Interv. EP3 2010). One interviewee claimed that more 
stringent institutionalisation was linked to the possibility of issue linkage—the Code 
“had a chance [...] because of the reform working party” (Interv. EP4 2010)—and 
another that “it is important not to treat this [the Code] totally in isolation. [...] There 
were three reports of the working group, so it was part of a broader package. So there’s 
a sense in which its results were also the product of some package deal” (Interv. EP2 
2010), with important conflict between small and big groups (Interv. EP4 2010).  
 
While our empirical documents cannot show us the precise content of such package 
deals, two explanations spring to mind: first, the empowerment of committees; second, 
the chair of the Working Group. In section 2, we identified committee chairs and large 
political parties and the rapporteurs as “winners” of fast-track legislation. Although our 
empirical evidence shows that committee chairs value far-reaching independence 
(Interv. EP2 2010), they may have agreed to more centralised rules because committees 
were not only put at the centre of the first reading stage, but were also granted a degree 
of discretion in interpreting the Code’s rules. In this conflict it is also likely that Dagmar 
Roth-Behrendt—a veteran member of the PSE—had significant clout and could take 
her large political group along (Interv. EP2 2010).  
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When following the negotiation, it is striking that the content of the Code was mainly 
discussed informally; negotiated and decided in the restricted setting of the Working 
Party; and not subjected to wider public debate. Indeed, the EP’s plenary tabled and 
rejected amendments to the revised Rules of Procedure—and, eventually, adopted Rule 
70—but it did not debate the substance of the Code itself (Interv. EP1 2009). 
 
In sum, we find some evidence in confirmation of H2: An overall reform agenda 
allowed for some more stringent institutional reform measures. Yet, due to continued 
reform resistance by the “winners” of fast-track legislation, these rules fall short of the 
complete set of indicators established above, with the contradictions to Rule 70 and 
vague formulations more open to interpretation than we would have expected.   
 
So far, we have shown how an overall reform context as a multi-issue process has 
facilitated agreement on the Code of Conduct as part of a package deal. In the 
following, we will trace the second causal argument behind H2: an overall reform 
context will also facilitate successful strategic framing by the EP’s leadership. Again, 
we find confirming as well as disconfirming evidence: the “leaders” did, indeed, 
consistently evoke collective parliamentary norms, and as part of the Corbett Report the 
Code was adopted by a large majority. Yet, the Code’s compromise character 
demonstrates that not all “winners” could be shamed into accepting stringent regulation.  
 
Arguments about how fast-track legislation challenged parliamentary norms—rather 
than the “losers’” vested interests alone—were made as early as 2001. Two years post-
Amsterdam the EP’s Vice-Presidents warned against two “manifest dangers”: 
“first, Parliament could find itself reduced to the role of the 16th Member State, with 
reduced opportunities for wider societal and political interests to introduce their points 
of view into the decision making process. […] second, open and public debate in the 
plenary with the full participation of all political groups and members would tend to be 
reduced in importance by informal negotiations taking place elsewhere. The essential 
transparency of the legislative process would be put at risk, threatening the agora 
function of this institution” (Imbeni et al. 2001, 2; italics in the original).  
 
This statement evokes key parliamentary norms: access and representation of interests, 
public deliberation, visible political conflict, a transparent legislative process. Yet, as 
discussed under H1 above, these arguments could not translate into institutional reform 
in the first half of the Sixth EP. Two environmental conditions had changed by 2009: 
first, the frequency and visibility of first-reading deals had reached the 50% threshold in 
2005 and continued to be high; second, the overall reform negotiations transformed the 
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discursive context. Both changes matter for our second causal argument: even a 
decentralised organisation is likely to reform, we suggested, where such attempts can be 
framed as a response to organisational—in addition to individual—concerns, can cluster 
broad support, and can shame “winners” into acceptance.  
 
When looking at public documents and debates, the institutionalisation of fast-track 
legislation was, indeed, framed as a direct response to defend the EP’s self-
understanding as a political—rather than intergovernmental or technocratic—actor. 
Echoing earlier criticism by the Vice-President’s, the EP’s 2004 Activity Report clearly 
illustrates this frame; appealing to the EP’s identity and self-interest, it recalls 
“the danger of becoming an adjunct to the Council [...]. [...] Parliament must ensure that 
it remains clearly visible to the European citizen as an autonomous, democratic 
institution which has its own positions and priorities [...]. Success in responding to these 
challenges, and in generating a more parliamentary style of behaviour on the part of the 
Council, will not only make the legislative procedure easier to understand but will 
contribute to creating a truly bicameral system at the European level” (European 
Parliament 2004a, 35).  
 
Hence, to advocate their reform agenda, “leaders” strategically framed the redress of 
fast-track legislation as defending a core norm: the EP’s role as the only directly elected 
EU institution, that was empowered to “fully parliamentaris[e]” codecision (European 
Parliament 2004a, 8). Documents and interviews show consensus on what a 
“parliamentary” process should entail: open debate on the shape of legislation; scope for 
the public to follow; transparent inter- and intra-organisational relations; and visible 
political contestation (European Parliament 2004a, 2007; Imbeni et al. 2001; Intervs. 
EP4 2009; EP3 2009; EP4 2009; EP2 2010; EP4 2010). When presenting its reform 
proposal, the Working Party pitched the Code as a defence of precisely these principles:  
“Where Parliament is asked to confirm in plenary a pre-negotiated agreement reached at 
informal meetings between a small number of representatives of the three Institutions 
[...] this certainly does not increase Parliament’s visibility in the public and the media, 
who are looking for political confrontation along clear political lines and not for a flat, 
‘technocratic’ debate where the representatives of the three Institutions congratulate 
each other on the ‘good work’ done” (Working Party 2007, 2f.).  
 
As our interviews demonstrate, it was only in the latter part of the Sixth EP that fast-
track legislation was seen in this light. By then, concerns about fast-track legislation 
focused on the unconstrained political power of individual actors; but they also revolved 
around the challenge to core parliamentary norms. An ever wider circle of actors within 
the EP associated early agreements with a lack of transparency, democracy and 
publicity in the legislative process (Intervs. EP3 2009; EP4 2009; EP 2 2010; EP4 
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2010), rather than with efficiency and policy gains that had dominated the image of 
fast-track legislation in the early years of its application (Intervs. EP4 2009; EP2 2010). 
This perception was intensified by the history of the EP’s empowerment through 
codecision. As one interviewee remarked: “the whole reform of the codecision 
procedure was [meant] [...] to make the Parliament known in public, to allow for 
debates” (Interv. EP4 2010); instead, in the eyes of the public, the EP was now seen to 
be colluding and negotiating with the Council in secret. Such a perception challenged 
the EP’s “view of itself as a defender of certain institutional prerogatives” as well as its 
identity as a “separate institution with its own kind of priorities and its own kind of 
vision of the world” (Interv. EP2 2010).   
 
Against this backdrop, it is even more surprising that the Code—framed as a measure to 
re-establish transparent, democratic and visible legislative decision-making—was itself 
mainly debated informally in the EP; discussed and decided by the restricted Working 
Party; and merely confirmed—rather than debated—in plenary.  
 
In short, our empirical evidence supports two aspects of the second causal argument. 
First, the EP’s leadership, indeed, framed the Code as a defence of collective 
organisational norms, and used the context of overall reform as a “discursive hook” to 
do so. Second, this frame resonated with—and was supported by—a wide parliamentary 
constituency in the EP, although the Code itself was only voted but not debated in 
plenary. Third, attempting to re-establish the key role of the parliamentary committee, 
to introduce a degree of control over parliamentary representation vis-à-vis the Council, 
to improve the transparency of the procedure, and to re-establish the role of the plenary 
the Code can, indeed, be read as redressing some of the above-identified challenges to 
the Parliament as a collective actor. The Code’s adoption just prior to the 2009 EP 
elections—coupled with continued concerns about turnout and EP elections as “second 
order” (Reif/Schmitt 1980)—also demonstrates awareness of external normative 
criticism. At the same time, the above-described evidence of compromise and continued 
contestation clearly shows that not all “winners” could be shamed into accepting 
stringent rules to fully re-establish the challenged parliamentary norms.  
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Conclusion  
 
Our paper investigated the EP’s response to the most recent and most striking 
transformation of EU legislative politics: the trend to adopt legislation at first reading. 
Our paper argues that—contrary to early expectations and concerns—the introduction 
of codecision has made EU legislation neither more “parliamentary” nor less efficient. 
Instead, the routine use of fast-track legislation in the Fifth and Sixth EP has led to 1) an 
increasing recourse to informal and secluded political processes; 2) intensive inter-
organisational cooperation between EP and Council; and 3) growing intra-
organisational conflict over the conduct of codecision in Parliament.  
 
Our paper theorised the consequences of fast-track legislation for the EP. Drawing on 
rational choice institutionalism and bargaining theory, we argued that fast-track 
legislation shifts new opportunities and legislative influence to those actors who 
represent the EP vis-à-vis the Council—first and foremost, rapporteurs, but also large 
political groups and committee chairs—and imposes new constraints on the power of  
those actors who predominantly play in one decision-arena—first and foremost, rank-
and-file MEPs, small political parties and the EP’s leadership. We therefore expected 
“winners” to defend the institutional status quo of unconstrained fast-track legislation, 
and “losers” and “leaders” to challenge the existing practice, with reform attempts 
focused on a) the scope of early agreements; b) control of trilogues; and c) access to 
information flows. In the decentralised EP, reform attempts would only succeed, we 
argued, where 1) the increase in fast-track legislation reaches a threshold of at least 
50%; and where 2) the organisation goes through a concomitant period of wider reform.  
 
We probed our argument empirically by analysing how the EP’s rules of fast-track 
legislation were contested and changed from the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty to adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files. To trace 
the causal importance of our variables, we sub-divided the 1999-2009 period into three 
phases: 1) 1999-2004 where a moderate increase of early agreements combined with the 
absence of organisational reform; 2) 2004-2006 where a steep increase of early 
agreements combined with an absence of overall reform; 3) 2007-2009 where a steep 
increase in early agreements combined with the presence of overall reform. Based on 
qualitative document analysis and a series of elite interviews, we found both 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence for our argument.  
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First, we found that, once fast-track legislation went above 50% of all codecision items, 
with differential empowerment clearly visible, the practice became contested in the EP; 
conflict concerned both the general desirability of first reading deals, and the EP’s 
internal rules of decision-making. As expected, reform attempts addressed the role of 
committees and small political parties in particular, seeking 1) to tighten control over 
trilogues (by strengthening the committee’s role in mandating, and by broadening 
parliamentary representation); and 2) to gain greater access to information (by defining 
the documents used in trilogues, institutionalising feedback, and installing a “cooling 
off period” before the formal vote in plenary). Yet, these reforms seem to have met with 
great resistance on the part of the “winners”: between 1999 and 2004 the EP had no 
consistent policy on the conduct of fast-track legislation, while the 2004 Guidelines, 
adopted by the Conference of the Presidents, were applied inconsistently in the Sixth 
EP. These findings are fully in line with our expectations for the EP as a decentralised 
organisation and given actors’ heterogeneous preferences. However, in May 2009 the 
EP’s plenary adopted a new Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files as 
Annex XX to the revised Rules of Procedure. Given its wide political backing, more 
binding nature, tighter constraints and greater visibility, the Code can be read as a first 
step towards successful redress through stringent institutional rules; yet, at the same 
time, the documents testify sustained resistance of selected parliamentary actors.  
 
While this development is puzzling in view of the EP’s continued decentralisation and 
ongoing preference divergence between “winners” and “losers”, we can explain the 
timing and content of institutional change in the following way. The combination of a 
high number of early agreements and the context of overall reform facilitated steps 
towards successful redress: first, by creating a multi-issue negotiation agenda, that 
allowed to adopt the Code as part of a wider reform package; and, second, by creating a 
discursive context, that allowed to cluster supporters—and to shame opponents—
around a “collective frame” of reforms as defending core parliamentary norms. Hence, 
while a high number of early agreements alone does not lead to stringent informal 
reform—with H1 accordingly disconfirmed—we find some evidence in confirmation of 
H2: where a steep increase in early agreements coincides with overall reform, issue 
linkage and strategic framing can translate contestation into more stringent rules. Yet, 
our analysis of the reform process and outcome also throws up disconfirmatory 
evidence: the “winners” continue to resist reform, and the adopted rules of fast-track 
legislation fall short of our expectations when it comes to enforceability and precision.  
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Our paper analysed the EP’s response to the routine use of fast-track legislation and the 
steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Future research will now need to follow 
up on whether and how the Code of Conduct is—or is not—successfully implemented, 
and whether the new rules decrease the number of early agreements. Such findings can 
contribute to the wider debate about shared decision-making in Comparative Politics in 
two ways: first, by re-directing attention from the impact of formal rule change on inter-
organisational relations to the consequences for intra-organisational decision-making, 
power shifts and institutional reform; and, second, by demonstrating how inter-
organisational relations can influence the development, contestation and strategic 
evocation of an organisation’s core norms. 
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